Pundits and Quacks: Financial Experts and Market Feedback by Rudiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Pundits and Quacks: Financial Experts
and Market Feedback
Jesper Rudiger and Adrien Vigier
European University Institute, University of Oslo
20. June 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56829/
MPRA Paper No. 56829, posted 25. June 2014 00:49 UTC
Pundits and Quacks: Financial Experts and
Market Feedback∗
Jesper Rudiger† and Adrien Vigier‡
Abstract
By choosing whether or not to follow a financial expert’s advice, a privately informed
trader implicitly screens the ability of this expert. We explore the performance of the
resulting feedback mechanism. In the medium run, feedback may altogether break down,
enabling experts of low ability to maintain a lasting reputation and affect prices durably.
Yet in the long run, the market almost always learns experts’ true type. While prices
get stuck in the medium run, they thus converge in the long run to the asset’s correct
valuation.
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1 Introduction
There exists an inherent tension between financial experts and those who listen to them:
analysts take risks in making recommendations, but do not fully internalize the costs of those
risks. This problem is ordinarily solved by the market itself: if a pundit were to consistently
give out bad advice, he would in time be driven out of his trade. Yet the recent crisis has
stressed the limitations of this market mechanism. Financial experts – who were later revealed
to have backed worthless assets against better knowledge – were considered highly reputable
up until the point of the market collapse.1 Why, then, did market screening apparently break
down, allowing quaks to stay in the market for so long?
To address the issue, this paper develops a model of asset markets in which information
is provided by a strategic expert of unknown ability and where feedback about the expert is
endogenous, and occurs through the impact of expert advice on prices. We show first that
prices deviate in the medium run from assets’ true value due to the occurrence of so-called
reputational cascades, whereby financial experts of low ability are able to maintain a lasting
reputation and affect prices durably. We then show that reputational cascades are almost
always transient, and that prices converge in the long run to their correct values.
The model works as follows. The market is made up of (a) a competitive and risk-neutral
market maker, (b) a financial expert, and (c) a sequence of traders. Each period a new trader
arrives and faces the option to buy and sell a given asset at the prices set by the market maker.
The expert provides information about the asset. A trader is of one of two types, defining the
motives of his trades. A trader is either an informed trader who trades to maximize profits at
the market maker’s expense, or a liquidity trader who trades for exogenous motives unrelated
to profits; a trader’s type is private information. The expert is either good or bad ; his type
too is private information. An expert of high ability receives informative signals of the asset’s
true value. A bad expert on the other hand knows nothing more than the publicly available
information about the asset. The expert’s reputation, which evolves over time, is defined as
the public belief that he is of the good type. We assume that the expert is motivated by career
concerns, and aims to maximize his reputation.2
Within each period, the timing of the game is as follows. If the expert is good, he observes
his private signal of the true asset value. The expert (whichever his type) then releases a report
1See for instance: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21594358-bear-market-or-bull-analysts-give-bad-advice-consistently-wrong.
2To keep the model tractable, we assume that the expert is myopic. Each period, he maximizes his expected
reputation next period.
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communicating his (possibly fake) information to the market participants. If the timing of
information acquisition is symmetric, then market maker and trader observe the report before
prices are set; we will say by contrast that the timing of information acquisition is asymmetric
if the market maker observes the report with delay, and after setting the prices. Finally,
the trader observes (a) the prices and (b) if a report was released, a private signal of the
expert’s ability, and decides whether to buy, sell, or abstain. The market then updates expert
reputation using Bayes’ rule based on all publicly available information at the end of the
period, consisting of the latest report and trading outcome.3
We first analyze the benchmark case in which timing of information acquisition is sym-
metric, i.e. where traders and market maker observe the report before trade. By lending
credibility to historical reports, positive signals of the expert type induce traders to follow
past trends in prices. Conversely, negative signals of the expert type lower the credibility
of historical reports, and induce traders to act as contrarians with respect to past trends.
Informed traders’ actions thus perfectly reflect their private information of the expert type.
We say in this case that screening of the expert is efficient. This in turn implies that new
statistical information about the expert becomes incorporated into prices each period.
We then explore the asymmetric case, i.e. where the market maker observes the report
with delay. An informed trader then possesses two pieces of information with which to make
profits against the market maker: the latest report, and his private signal of the expert type.
When these pieces of information clash, traders are faced with a dilemma. A trader may for
instance observe a positive report, but receive a negative signal about expert ability. In this
example, the report suggests that the asset may currently be undervalued, while the signal
about expert ability suggests that past trends in prices may have overvalued the asset. When
such dilemmas occur the trader’s decision to buy, sell or abstain depends in general on the
entire history. However, we show that if expert reputation is high and past trends indecisive
then, in equilibrium, traders ignore the private signal they receive and blindly follow the report
they observe: traders’ actions no longer reveal information about expert ability. We say in
this case that screening of the expert breaks down. Information about the expert conveyed
to the market in that period – if any at all – must therefore proceed from the report itself.
Hence, a bad expert can fully hide his type by choosing to mimic the reporting behavior of a
good expert.4 Indeed, we establish that mimicking of the good type is in this case optimal for
3In fact, we show that the relation between trading outcomes and prices is one-to-one. Hence, an alternative
– perhaps more realistic – formulation is to say that Bayesian updating is based upon the evolution of prices.
4Outside a cascade, a bad expert will not copy the behavior of a good expert completely. In particular, he
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a bad expert. Thus, in equilibrium, a break-down of screening ultimately prevents any new
information about the expert from being incorporated into prices. We say in this case that a
reputational cascade occurs.
The possibility of a reputational cascade hinges upon the ability of an expert of given
ability to achieve reputation above a certain threshold. Moreover, this threshold varies with
the history, raising two difficulties. First, attempting to approach the threshold may be self-
defeating if, on the path toward it, the threshold in fact rises. Second, as the expert nears
the current threshold, traders’ screening of the expert gradually loses its efficiency. Acting
strategically, a bad expert will in turn adopt a reporting behavior comparable to that of a good
expert. This implies that the closer he gets to actually achieving the threshold, the smaller
the scope for improving his reputation. We show (Theorem 1) that in spite of these difficulties
reputational cascades set off with positive probability irrespective of (i) expert type, and (ii)
initial reputation.
While the occurrence of cascades implies that prices do get stuck in the medium run,
we show next that prices converge in the long run to the asset’s correct valuation (Theorem
2): if the expert is good, prices converge to the true asset value; if the expert is bad, prices
converge to the unconditional mean. Reputational cascades are therefore transient events. The
intuition is as follows. When the market is in a cascade, it stops accumulating information
about the expert, but continues accumulating information about the asset. The greater the
information contained in the public history, the more critical the signal of the expert type.
An overwhelming dominance of historical positive reports, say, will push the public valuation
of the asset – and therefore prices – up toward their highest value. On the other hand, a
trader with a negative signal of the expert type will see his valuation of the asset revert
toward the unconditional mean. The higher the price, the more the trader believes the asset
to be overvalued. When prices are sufficiently close to 1, this will induce him to trade against
historical trends (i.e. sell the asset), independently of the report he observes within that
period. Traders’ screening of the expert thus becomes efficient again, and the market exits
the cascade it was in. At that point, if the expert is bad his reputation will fall (on average)
and drive prices back to their unconditional mean. If the expert is good, his reputation will
rise (on average), and allow him to convey through his reports the information he possesses
about the asset’s true value.
The possible occurrence of reputational cascades has far-reaching consequences for the
will not publish reports as often as the bad expert, as publishing releases information about his ability.
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functioning of financial markets, and could help shed light on events related to the recent
financial crisis. First and foremost, our paper provides a tractable model explaining financial
markets’ difficulty in evaluating experts when feedback about ability is endogenous, and occurs
through the impact of expert advice on prices. In states of the world where experts turn out
to be good, the occurrence of a cascade slows down price convergence to the true asset value.
More distressingly perhaps, is the observation that cascades allow experts of low ability to
maintain their reputation and affect prices for a considerable amount of time. As long as price
movements remain informative about expert ability, then price deviations from long-run levels
are impeded on two fronts: (a) a bad expert’s reputation will on average decrease, limiting his
impact on prices; (b) a bad expert exposes himself by publishing reports, and will therefore
avoid releasing (false) information. In a cascade, these two arguments no longer hold, and an
expert with low ability inevitably exerts greater influence on prices.
After the literature review, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model of
a financial market with advice. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium behavior within a given
period of our model. Section 4 addresses the paper’s central question and explores how much
and what kind of information becomes incorporated into prices over time. Section 5 discusses
specific aspects of our paper: herding, prices’ informational efficiency, and the implications of
our model for market frenzies and crashes. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in
the Appendix.
1.1 Relation to Literature
The present paper is to the best of our knowledge the first to (i) examine financial experts’
impact on asset prices when feedback about ability is endogenous and occurs through prices
themselves, and (ii) assess financial markets’ performance in evaluating experts of unknown
ability.
We first and foremost contributes to the literature exploring the role of experts in procuring
information in financial markets. This literature starts with Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) who
studied a strategic expert’s disclosure of information, and showed that the optimal strategy
typically entails the artificial addition of noise to the information possessed by the expert, in
order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to leakage through informative
prices. Yet in their paper, no uncertainty remains in equilibrium about the quality of the
information provided by the expert. Our paper is in this sense closer to the work of Benabou
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and Laroque (1992) or Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006). Benabou and Laroque analyze the
credibility of a financial expert with short-run incentives to deceive the market and resort to
insider trading.5 However, in their model, prices play no role in evaluating the expert. By
contrast we endogenize the feedback about expert ability, which in our model occurs through
prices. Ottaviani and Sørensen model professional forecasters who endeavor, through their
forecasts of a stock price, to convince the market that they are well informed. If the forecasts
affect the price, a ‘beauty contest’ emerges among forecasters. In their model there is no
issue of screening as traders have no information about experts, whereas our focus is on the
dynamic revelation of traders’ information about experts, and the ultimate failure of the
market to properly channel this information.6
Our paper also contributes to the literature on herding in financial markets: the occurrence
of reputational cascades in our model is akin to herd behavior on the part of informed traders.
The first traders to arrive screen the expert according to their private signal of the expert type.
A trader who arrives following a sequence of reputation-enhancing events, however, believes
that with high probability those who came before him observed positive signals of the expert
type. When the sequence of reputation-enhancing events is sufficiently long, the expected
information contained in the expert’s reports swamps that of the trader’s private signal about
the expert. At that point, even if he observes a negative signal of the expert type, the trader
will decide to trust the expert and trade according to the advice contained in his report. Our
paper crucially distinguishes itself from existing models of herding in financial markets – such
as for instance Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Banerjee (1992), Avery and Zemsky (1998), or
Park and Sabourian (2011) – by the fact that information about the asset is provided by a
strategic expert of unknown ability. This implies that:
1. the extent of the information asymmetry between traders and market maker evolves
over time, according to the reputation of the expert;
2. if traders ever ignore private information about expert ability, then bad experts will hide
their type – by mimicking the behavior of good experts.
Both implications lie at the very heart of our analysis. By the first point, when expert
reputation is high, the information asymmetry is mainly driven by the content of the expert’s
5In a similar vein, Allen and Gale (1992) investigate how an uninformed manipulator can make a profit on
the stock market by pretending to be an informed trader.
6More generally, we are connected to the broader reputational cheap talk literature (Scharfstein and Stein,
1990; Trueman, 1994; Zwiebel, 1998), which does not analyze asset markets. They find that experts tend to
bias reports toward priors and that multiple experts tend to herd.
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report and traders will optimally ignore private information about expert ability; this and
the second point together imply that once expert reputation reaches a threshold, then new
information about the expert altogether stops reaching the market: a reputational cascade
sets off, allowing experts of low ability to maintain a lasting reputation.
Finally, the break-down of learning about expert type occurring in our model is related
to the market break-down occurring in Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003). In their model a series of
Principals sequentially interact with a single Agent, whose type (good or bad) is unknown to
the Principals. In some cases, the good Agent should take a given action, but that action is
also the preferred action of a bad Agent. To distinguish himself, the good Agent then favors
the inefficient action, but by doing so he kills the Principals’ incentives to hire him. In both
that paper and ours, the crux lies in the failure of each Principal (viz. informed traders) to
internalize the benefits to others from learning about the type of the Agent (viz. the financial
expert). However the break-down of learning takes opposite forms in the two papers: In Ely
and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) learning breaks down because the Principals stop ‘trading’; by contrast
learning breaks down (viz. a reputational cascade occurs) in our paper because the Principals
trade with probability one.7
2 The Model
We model a discrete-time sequential trade market for a financial asset in the spirit of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). The traded asset has fundamental value θ which takes its value in
{−1, 1} with equal probability: E[θ] = 0. In each period there are three participants to the
market: a market maker (MM), a financial expert (FE), and a trader. The market maker and
the expert are long lived, whereas a new trader arrives each period. The market maker sets
prices at which he wishes to trade the asset. The expert provides information about the asset.
Finally, the trader decides whether or not to trade. We next provide the details and notation
describing this market.
The Market Maker. Each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... the MM posts ask (pat ) and bid (p
b
t)
prices at which he will sell or buy one unit of the asset, respectively. We assume that the MM
is risk-neutral and competitive. Quoted prices thus equal the expected asset value conditional
on all information available to the MM at the time of trade.
7In our model, when the market is in a reputational cascade, an informed trader buys the asset if he
observes a positive report and sells the asset if he observes a negative one.
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The Trader. Each period t a new trader arrives to the market and is given the opportu-
nity to trade one unit of the asset. The trader observes the prices set by the MM and decides
whether to buy at pat , sell at p
b
t , or abstain from trading. We let yt ∈ {a, b, n} denote the
trader’s action: yt = a if he buys, yt = b if he sells, and yt = n if he abstains. He subsequently
leaves the market.
The trader is of one of two types, defining the motives of his trades. The trader knows his
own type, while other market participants have probabilistic beliefs about the trader’s type.
With probability µ ∈ (0, 1), the trader is an informed trader and trades to maximize profits
at the market maker’s expense. With probability 1 − µ the trader is a liquidity trader and
trades for exogenous motives, unrelated to profits. A liquidity trader buys, abstains or sells
the asset with probability 1/3 each.
The Expert. The asset’s true value θ is unobserved. All supplementary information
about the asset – if any – is provided by the financial expert. Let τ denote the expert’s type,
which defines his ability: τ = G if he is good, τ = B if he is bad. His type is drawn at the
beginning of the game and known only to himself: τ = G with probability λ0 ∈ (0, 1), and
τ = B with probability 1− λ0. The parameter λ0 thus defines the reputation of the expert at
the beginning of the game. We assume that the expert is myopic and aims to maximize his
expected end-of-period reputation.8
Before trade takes place, a good expert receives the private signal xt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, where
xt = 0 is used to indicate that the FE receives no signal in that period. Let θ
G
t := E[θ|G;x1, ..., xt =
0], and θGt (xt) := E[θ|G;x1, ..., xt 6= 0]. We assume that the signal xt is imperfectly but posi-
tively correlated with θ, so that P(xt = θ|xt 6= 0) = φ ∈ (1/2, 1). A bad expert has no private
information concerning the asset: Et[θ|B] = 0.9
Financial Reports. In each period the FE communicates with market participants
through the report rt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, where rt = 0 if the expert chooses not to release a report.
We will say that the timing of information acquisition is symmetric if the report is observed
by all market participants before price setting. By contrast, we will say that the timing of
information acquisition is asymmetric if the MM observes the report with delay, and after
setting the prices.
We assume that by reading the expert’s report, the trader learns about the expert’s true
8We later describe reputation updating.
9See subsection on timing and strategies for a formal definition of the operator Et[.].
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Good expert
observes xt
Expert issues
report rt
Trader observes
rt and st
Price setting Trade Reputation
updating
Symmetric Case:
MM observes rt
Asymmetric Case:
MM observes rt
Figure 1 – Timing
type. For instance, the expert may in his reports reveal some information regarding his
assessment of other auxiliary economic variables which traders know something about, and
which they can then use to make inferences about the expert’s type.10 For simplicity, we
assume that the trader observes the signal st ∈ {0, 1} satisfying
P(st = 1|τ = G, rt = xt 6= 0) = pi,
where pi ∈ (0, 1), and P(st = 1|·) = 0 otherwise. A good expert receiving private signal
xt ∈ {−1, 1} and accurately reporting his private information thus provides evidence of his
ability with probability pi.11
Timing and Strategies. The timing of the game, within each period, is as follows (c.f.
Figure 1). If τ = G, the expert first observes his private signal xt. The expert (irrespective of
his type) then releases the report rt. If the timing of information acquisition is symmetric, the
MM observes rt and announces the ask and bid prices; if the timing is asymmetric, the MM
sets the prices before observing rt. Finally, the trader observes the report, his private signal
about the expert and the prices, and decides whether to buy, sell, or abstain. The market then
updates the reputation using Bayes’ rule, based on all publicly available information when the
period ends, consisting of the latest report and trading outcome.
10A simple way of modeling this is to introduce an auxiliary random variable Zt, uniformly distributed on
the unit interval. The expert, if he is good, observes Ztt with probability pi in each period. The period-t
trader, on the other hand, always observes Zt.
11Our specification of st thus makes three separate assumptions. First, rt 6= xt implies st = 0. This ensures
that truth-telling is strictly dominant for a good expert (see Lemma 1). Second, rt = 0 implies st = 0. This
assumption is made for the sake of realism, but affects neither the results of Theorem 1 nor of those of Theorem
2. Second, st = 0 always if τ = B. This assumption is for computational simplicity only. All that is required
is that the signal st satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property.
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Let Rt := (r0, ..., rt) denote the sequence of reports and Yt := (y0, ..., yt) the sequence of
trades up to and including period t. Ht denotes the public information at the beginning of
period t, consisting of previous trades and reports: Ht := {Rt−1,Yt−1}. Define Pt(·) := P(·|Ht)
as the probability operator conditional on Ht. Define similarly the conditional expectation
operator Et[·] := E[·|Ht]. The updated reputation conditional on the the report rt and the
trading outcome yt is thus:
λt+1(rt, yt) =
λtPt(rt, yt|G)
λtPt(rt, yt|G) + (1− λt)Pt(rt, yt|B) .
For each period t, we let q
t
(xt) denote the strategy of a good expert, as a function of his
private signal xt, and σt denote the strategy of a bad expert. q
rt
t (xt) (resp., σ
rt
t ) denotes the
probability with which a good expert releases rt (resp., with which a bad expert releases rt).
ξ
t
(rt, st) denotes an informed trader’s strategy, as a function of the report rt and his private
signal st of the expert. We let ξ
yt
t (rt, st) denote the probability with which he takes action yt.
Finally, p
t
:= (pat , p
b
t).
Equilibrium. The structure of the game described above is common knowledge. To
avoid uninteresting ‘babbling’ equilibria, we focus the analysis on truthful equilibria, i.e. in
which a good expert simply reports the signal he observes: qrtt (xt) = 1 if rt = xt.
Definition 1. Given history Ht, the triplet (σt, ξt, pt) constitutes a (truthful) equilibrium in
period t if an expert of type τ = G truthfully reports his private signal xt of the true asset
value, while:
1. σt maximizes a bad expert’s expected reputation in the beginning of period t+ 1.
2. ξ
t
maximizes an informed trader’s expected profits from trade.
3. Prices are set competitively; for y = a, b:
pyt = Et[θ|yt = y, rt] if information acquisition is symmetric
pyt = Et[θ|yt = y] if information acquisition is asymmetric.
The following simple result establishes the rationality of a good expert’s behavior implicit
in a truthful equilibrium.
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Lemma 1. If (σt, ξt, pt) constitutes a (truthful) equilibrium in period t then, given (σt, ξt, pt),
truthfully reporting his private signal xt maximizes Et[λt+1|G].
We can now formally define our concept of equilibrium. A family of strategies for FE,
informed traders, and MM is a (truthful) equilibrium of our game if for all t, and all Ht, it
induces a (truthful) equilibrium in period t.
Throughout, the vector q
t
summarizes public beliefs about a truthful good expert’s be-
havior in period t. Thus, qrtt := Pt(xt = rt).
3 Preliminary Analysis: Informed Traders and the Screen-
ing of Expert Type
We exploit in this section the recursive structure of our model, making t and the history Ht
into parameters of the analysis, and exploring the one-shot game played within period t among
(a) the MM, (b) the current trader, and (c) the FE.
Price adjustments reflecting information of the MM typically eliminate the inefficiency aris-
ing in the classic herding models (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992), whereby traders
fail to act upon their own private information. Yet, with sufficient information asymmetry
between traders and MM, traders may rationally choose to ignore part of the information
they possess (Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Park and Sabourian, 2011). In our model, this occurs
when (i) traders observe reports before the MM, and (ii) expert reputation is high. Section
3.1 establishes the necessity of the first condition; section 3.2 demonstrates the necessary and
sufficient nature of the two conditions.
The following notation and definitions will be used throughout the paper. vt(rt, st) :=
Et[θ|rt, st] denotes an informed trader’s valuation of the asset in period t after observing the
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report rt and signal st. Thus:
vt(1, 1) = θ
G
t (1),
vt(1, 0) =
λtq
+
t (1− pi)
λtq
+
t (1− pi) + (1− λt)σ+t
θGt (1),
vt(0, 0) =
λtq
0
t
λtq0t + (1− λt)σ0t
θGt ,
vt(−1, 1) = θGt (−1),
vt(−1, 0) = λtq
−
t (1− pi)
λtq
−
t (1− pi) + (1− λt)σ−t
θGt (−1).
The equilibrium ranking of the valuations determines informed traders’ actions, which in turn
determine the information reflected in prices. Much of our model’s interest springs from the
fact that rather than being fixed, the ranking of the valuations – and, by way of consequence,
the information reflected in prices – typically evolves over time. We establish in the Appendix,
as an intermediary result, that if θGt (−1) > 0 then in any equilibrium vt(1, 1) is (strictly) the
highest valuation and vt(−1, 0) (strictly) the lowest valuation.12 It is easy to see that if
θGt (−1) < 0 < θGt (1) then vt(−1, 1) is (strictly) the lowest valuation and vt(1, 1) (strictly) the
highest valuation.
Define also p0t as the market maker’s valuation of the asset at the time of setting the prices
(but before knowing the trade order). It is sometimes useful to think of p0t as the price that
the MM would set if he knew the trader in period t to be a liquidity trader. This yields:
p0t := Et[θ|rt] if information acquisition is symmetric;
p0t := Et[θ] if information acquisition is asymmetric.
Finally, we will say, broadly speaking, that screening is efficient in period t when informed
traders’ actions perfectly reflect their private information, and that screening breaks down
when traders’ actions are independent of the signal st.
Definition 2. Given trading strategy ξ
t
, say that screening is efficient if ξytt (rt, 1) > 0⇒
ξytt (rt, 0) = 0, ∀ yt, rt.
Definition 3. Given trading strategy ξ
t
, say that screening breaks down on the positive side
12By symmetry, if θGt (1) < 0 then in any equilibrium vt(−1, 1) is (strictly) the lowest valuation and vt(1, 0)
(strictly) the highest valuation.
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(resp., negative side) if there exist yt ∈ {a, b, n} such that ξytt (1, 1) = 1 = ξytt (1, 0) (resp., such
that ξytt (−1, 1) = 1 = ξytt (−1, 0)). Say that screening breaks down if it does so on both the
positive and negative side.
When screening is efficient then, conditional on the report rt, an informed trader observing
st = 1 never takes the action of an informed trader observing st = 0. This allows the market
to learn about the expert. By contrast, when screening breaks down, an informed trader
observing st = 1 always takes the action of an informed trader observing st = 0. Conditional
on the report rt, a trader’s action yt then reveals nothing about the expert.
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3.1 Symmetric Timing of Information Acquisition
We begin with the simplest case and show that if traders and MM observe the report be-
fore price setting then, in equilibrium, informed traders’ actions always reflect their private
information about the expert.
When the timing of information acquisition is symmetric the only informational asymmetry
between trader and MM pertains to (a) the trader’s own type (informed vs. liquidity), and
(b) the trader’s signal st of the expert type. After observing the report, but before observing
the trade order, the MM updates his belief that the expert is good based on the knowledge
of rt. This yields
p0t =
λtq
rt
t
λtq
rt
t + (1− λt)σrtt
θGt (rt).
As indicated earlier, one may think of p0t as liquidity traders’ ‘valuation’ of the asset. Since
equilibrium prices reflect a weighted average of the valuations of trading agents, any equilib-
rium price can be expressed as a weighted average of vt(rt, 0), p
0
t , and vt(rt, 1).
Trading behavior then depends on the sign of the valuations. First, if θGt (rt) > 0 we obtain,
by immediate inspection, the inequalities
vt(rt, 0) < p
0
t < vt(rt, 1).
Thus in any equilibrium (a) informed traders observing st = 1 buy with probability 1, while
(b) informed traders observing st = 0 sell with probability 1. Second, if θ
G
t (rt) < 0 the above
inequalities are reversed, and so are the optimal actions of traders. Third, if θGt (rt) = 0 the
13The qualification is important, since the report itself may reveal something about the expert type.
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above inequalities become equalities, and this leaves traders indifferent between trading or
abstaining. Our first proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1. Consider symmetric timing of information acquisition. In equilibrium, screen-
ing is efficient, except possibly in the special case where θGt (rt) = 0.
Whenever information acquisition is symmetric, the price mechanism will force traders
to reveal the only piece of private information which they possess: their signal about the
expert. In other words, Proposition 1 establishes the necessity of asymmetry in the timing of
information acquisition for screening to break down.14
3.2 Asymmetric Timing of Information Acquisition
We now show that when the MM observes reports with delay then, in equilibrium, traders’
actions may stop reflecting their private information.
Under asymmetric timing of information acquisition, an informed trader possesses at the
time of trade two pieces of information with which to make profits against the market maker:
the latest report, and his private signal of the expert type. When these pieces of information
clash, traders are faced with a dilemma.
Suppose to fix ideas that past trends in prices are positive, such that θGt (rt) > 0, for all
rt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. An informed trader now observes (rt, st) = (1, 0). On the one hand, the
current report suggests that prices likely undervalue the asset’s true value. The private signal
of expert ability, on the other hand, suggests that the market may overestimate the expert.
Since we assumed past trends in prices – driven by the expert – to be positive, this in turn
suggests that prices likely overvalue the asset’s true value.
We next show that if expert reputation is high then an equilibrium can be found where,
when such dilemmas occur, an informed trader always follows the information contained in
the report and ignores his private signal of the expert.
Lemma 2. Consider asymmetric timing of information acquisition. There exists λˆt ∈ (0, 1)
such that screening breaks down in some equilibrium of period t if and only if λt ≥ λˆt.
The intuition is as follows. As λt approaches 1, the valuation of a trader observing rt
14See Rudiger and Vigier (2014) for a formal study of information acquisition in sequential trading models,
as well as the seminal work of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
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approaches θGt (rt), independently of the signal st. Furthermore,
p0t = λtθ
G
t ,
and thus liquidity traders’ ‘valuation’ of the asset tends to θGt as λt approaches 1. A market
maker receiving, say, a buy order, sets the price to reflect the mean of the valuations from
the potential buyers he may be facing. In this weighted average, the weight of θGt is bounded
below by the positive mass of liquidity traders. Since θGt (−1) < θGt < θGt (1), it follows that we
can find an equilibrium in which all informed traders observing rt = 1 choose to buy the asset
and where all informed traders observing rt = −1 choose to sell the asset – independently of
the signal st.
As usual in models of strategic communication, our framework generally allows multiple
equilibria to exist. This puts a question mark on the scope of Lemma 2. Our next result
addresses the issue, by establishing that if screening breaks down in one equilibrium, then this
must be the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Consider asymmetric timing of information acquisition. If an equilibrium of period
t exists where screening breaks down, then this is the unique equilibrium of period t.
We here sketch the main arguments of the proof. We suppose that a no-screening equilib-
rium exists alongside with another equilibrium, and proceed to analyze the second equilibrium.
Denote these two equilibria by E1 and E2, respectively, and denote by σ1 and σ2 the strategy
of a bad expert in the two equilibria, respectively.
First, suppose that σ+2 > σ
+
1 . Then the expected reputation from publishing a positive
report must be lower in E2 than in E1: one, a positive report is more likely to be sent
by a bad expert; two, there is no less screening in E2 than in E1, since E1 is a no-screening
equilibrium. Notice also that, in any equilibrium, the expected reputation from not publishing
a report is entirely determined by a bad expert’s strategy, since no information is revealed by
traders’ actions in this case (their private signal is always zero). Thus, if σ+2 > σ
+
1 then we
must have σ02 > σ
0
1. If not, then in E2 the expected reputation from not publishing a report
would be greater than that of publishing a positive report, which would be inconsistent with
equilibrium. As a consequence, σ−2 < σ
−
1 .
Next, we show in the proof that the less likely it is that a report was published by a bad
expert, the less traders gain from screening it. Thus: since σ−2 < σ
−
1 and E1 is a no-screening
equilibrium, screening must break down on the negative side in E2. But then the expected
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reputation from publishing a negative report is greater in E2 than it is in E1. Combining
this observation with our first remark above finally shows that in E2, the expected reputation
from publishing a negative report is greater than that from publishing a positive report. But
this is inconsistent with equilibrium.
It follows from the steps above that expert strategies must be the same in the two equilibria,
and since expert strategies completely determine traders’ valuations, prices are also the same.
The final part of the proof then shows that if prices are the same in the two equilibria, then
screening breaks down in E2 as well. Thus, the two equilibria are identical.
Lemma 2 establishes the necessary conditions for an equilibrium to exist in which screening
breaks down. Lemma 3 shows that if screening breaks down in one equilibrium, then this
equilibrium is unique. Combining these observations therefore yields this section’s main result:
Proposition 2. Consider asymmetric timing of information acquisition. Then in equilibrium
screening breaks down in period t if and only if λt ≥ λˆt, with λˆt as defined in Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 establishes that asymmetric timing of information acquisition and high rep-
utation are necessary and sufficient for screening to break down in equilibrium.
3.3 Screening and Expert Behavior
We conclude Section 3 by shedding light on the expert’s reporting strategy as a function of
traders’ screening behavior.15
A break-down of screening in period t implies that, conditional on the report rt, a trader’s
action yt reveals nothing about the expert. Information about the expert conveyed to the
market in that period – if any at all – must therefore proceed from the report itself. Hence,
a bad expert can fully hide his type by mimicking the behavior of a good one. We show that
indeed this is the optimal course of action.
The situation is otherwise more intricate. When screening occurs, the information con-
tained in the signal st is (imperfectly, due to liquidity traders) transmitted to the market and
leads on average to a decrease of reputation for a bad expert. This creates an incentive for
a bad expert to behave less aggressively in his reporting strategy than a good expert would
(i.e. to publish fewer reports). Let in what follows σt = σ
+
t + σ
−
t (resp., qt = q
+
t + q
−
t ) denote
the aggressiveness of a bad expert (resp., a good expert). We then have:
15Naturally, in equilibrium traders’ screening behavior is itself function of the information contained in the
reports of the expert.
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Proposition 3. In equilibrium, when screening breaks down, then σt = qt. Otherwise, a bad
expert is less aggressive than a good expert: σt < qt.
A break-down of screening is thus associated with an increase in the reporting activity
of bad experts. In this way, markets with no screening are more likely to incorporate ‘bad
information’ into prices, because experts of low ability will relish the opportunity to publish
reports without the risk of being exposed.
4 Reputational Cascades
We turn with this section to the central question of our paper: how much and what kind of
information becomes incorporated into prices over time?
We begin with the key definitions of our analysis. A complete informational cascade
occurs when the distribution over observable outcomes is statistically independent of the
underlying state of nature, here consisting of the fundamental value θ and the expert type τ .
A reputational cascade on the other hand is a partial informational cascade; it requires only
that the distribution over observable outcomes be independent of the expert type τ . Thus, in
a reputational cascade, prices stop incorporating any new information about the expert, but
may still incorporate some information about the asset’s true value.
Definition 4. A complete informational cascade occurs in period t when
Pt(rt, yt|θ, τ) = Pt(rt, yt) , ∀ rt, yt.
Definition 5. A reputational cascade occurs in period t when
Pt(rt, yt|τ) = Pt(rt, yt) , ∀ rt, yt.
We now ask the question: do informational cascades of any kind ever occur as part of an
equilibrium of our model? We begin with a simple negative result, and establish that complete
informational cascades are prevented from ever taking place.
Proposition 4. A complete informational cascade never occurs in any equilibrium.
While complete informational cascades are prevented from ever occurring, the results of
Section 3 concerning the possibility of screening breaking down suggest on the other hand the
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possibility of reputational cascades actually taking place in equilibrium. First, by Proposition
2, high expert reputation will induce a break-down of screening (under asymmetric timing
of information acquisition). Second, by Proposition 3, a break-down of screening will induce
a bad expert to fully hide his type by mimicking the behavior of a good expert. Hence,
assuming asymmetric information acquisition, the distribution over observable outcomes will
be the same independently of the expert type if – but only if – the expert ever achieves a
threshold level of reputation λˆt. The question is then: starting with initial reputation λ0, will
an expert of type τ ever gain sufficient reputation?
We show in the Appendix that the threshold λˆt needed to set off a break-down of screening
depends on the history Ht through the sequence of historical reports Rt−1. This observation
raises two difficulties. First, if the threshold increases with expert reputation, the expert’s
efforts to achieve the threshold level of reputation may be self-defeating. Second, screening
gradually loses its efficiency as one approaches the threshold, and a bad expert optimally
responds by behaving more like a good expert. This implies that the closer one gets to
actually achieving the threshold, the smaller the scope for improving the reputation.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the following result establishes that whichever the initial
reputation of the expert, and whichever the ability type of the expert, a period t and history
Ht can be found in which a reputational cascade begins.
Theorem 1.
1. Symmetric timing of information acquisition: A reputational cascade never oc-
curs in any equilibrium.
2. Asymmetric timing of information acquisition: In any equilibrium, for all λ0 >
0 and τ ∈ {G,B}, a reputational cascade occurs with strictly positive probability.
The proof of the first part rests on Proposition 1, and the observation that screening must
break down for a reputational cascade to occur. The proof of the second part contains three
steps. Step 1 formalizes the argument that, in equilibrium, a break-down of screening sets off
a reputational cascade. Step 2 establishes sufficient conditions inducing efficient screening,
and allows us to bound below the per-period growth of reputation following a reputation-
enhancing event in period t (e.g. the release of a positive report followed by an increase
in the price). We show as a result that, starting with initial reputation λ0, any level of
reputation can be reached with positive probability even by a bad expert. Step 3 then shows
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that once the expert has achieved sufficient reputation, there is a path on which he maintains
his reputation but the threshold λˆt needed to set off a break-down of screening falls. Using
step 1 therefore establishes that a cascade eventually sets off on this path. Finally, since it
contains a finite number of steps (each of which has non-zero probability), this path occurs
with strictly positive probability.
The occurrence of reputational cascades naturally raises the question of prices’ informa-
tional efficiency in the long run.16 Since the FE provides all information concerning the asset,
prices’ long run convergence is intimately linked to the learning of the expert type. A number
of observations can be made already at this point.
First, while reputational cascades are favorable to experts of low ability, maintaining status
quo is a difficult task. If he could avoid releasing new reports, a bad expert could sustain
a cascade indefinitely. However, in equilibrium, a bad expert must mimic the behavior of a
good one.17 Each period a new report is therefore published with probability 1/2. Moreover,
reports must eventually support either θ = 1 or θ = −1, since |θGt | → 1 if the expert is good.18
But notice that θGt → 1 yields
vt(−1, 0) ' vt(1, 0) < p0t < vt(−1, 1) ' vt(1, 1),
while θGt → −1 gives
vt(−1, 1) ' vt(1, 1) < p0t < vt(−1, 0) ' vt(1, 0).
In both cases the inequalities imply that screening eventually becomes efficient, and cascades
therefore eventually end.
Our second remark pertains to the evolution of reputation under ‘normal’ circumstances.
By Proposition 3 a bad expert behaves less aggressively than a good one when the market is
outside of a reputational cascade. His reputation thus falls if he avoids to release a report.
Since in equilibrium he must be indifferent between reporting or not, he must on average lose
reputation from one period to the next: Et[λt+1|B] < λt. Moreover, reputation is a martingale:
λt = Et[λt+1] = λtEt[λt+1|G] + (1− λt)Et[λt+1|B].
16I.e. whether or not prices successfully aggregate private information in the long run (so-called strong-form
informational efficiency).
17See Proposition 3.
18If τ = G, then |θGt | → 1 is immediate, by the Law of Large Numbers.
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Hence Et[λt+1|G] > λt: a good expert on average gains reputation from one period to the
next. Reputation thus drifts in the appropriate direction, irrespective of the expert type.
However, the question of learning remains: will sufficiently much information filter through
that reputation converges to either 0 or 1? And if so, can incorrect learning ever occur, so
that reputation tends to 1 when τ = B or to 0 when τ = G? We establish through Theorem
2 that in the long run the market learns the expert’s true type.19 While prices get stuck in
the medium run (Theorem 1), they converge in the long run to the asset’s correct valuation.
Theorem 2. Consider asymmetric timing of information acquisition. In any equilibrium:
1. Conditional on τ = G, prices converge almost surely to the true asset value θ.
2. Conditional on τ = B, prices converge almost surely to zero.
Our proof of Theorem 2 has two main steps. We begin by showing that λ = limλt takes
value in {0, 1}.20 If for some realization λ tended to λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) then arguments similar to those
used above (where we establish that cascades are transient events) would show that screening
eventually becomes efficient along the induced path. But if screening is efficient then changes
in reputation from one period to the next are bounded away from zero, which contradicts the
convergence. Thus λ ∈ {0, 1}. We next establish in the second step that if τ = B then the
ratio λ/(1− λ) must be integrable, as must be the inverse ratio if τ = G. Using the first step
hence shows that if τ = B then λ = 0 a.s., and similarly that λ = 1 a.s. if τ = G. The market
thus learns the expert’s true type with probability 1. The proof is concluded by noting that
θGt → θ if the expert is in fact a good expert.
5 Discussion
5.1 Sequential Trading and Prices’ Informational Efficiency
The question of prices’ informational efficiency in sequential trading was first studied in the
seminal paper of Glosten and Milgrom (1985).21 Their analysis may broadly speaking be
19We thus establish that E[λt|B] not only decreases but converges in fact to 0 and, similarly, that E[λt|G]
not only increases but converges in fact to 1. The Dominated Convergence Theorem then gives P(λ = 0|B) = 1
and P(λ = 1|G) = 1, where λ denotes the limit of λt (which we know exists by the Martingale Convergence
Theorem).
20As noted earlier reputation is a bounded martingale, and so the limit exists.
21See also Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Dasgupta and Prat (2008).
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summarized as follows. Since prices follow a bounded martingale, they converge to some
value p. Provided that each period the probability of a buy and a sell order are bounded
below, the bid-ask spread therefore converges to zero. Adverse selection in the market must
therefore disappear in the long run.
In our model all information about the asset is provided by the FE. Adverse selection in
the market thus disappears when either (a) the expert’s reputation tends to 0, or (b) prices
tend to −1/1.22 Prices’ long run convergence to their correct values can therefore not be
deduced from Glosten and Milgrom (1985).23 The question of correct convergence boils down
to whether or not the market learns the expert’s true type. The market we model ultimately
succeeds in aggregating private information due to the self-defeating nature of the bad expert’s
optimal strategy: the more the latter tries to convince the market that he knows the asset’s
true value, the more the market wants to know whether this information is correct or not.
There will therefore always be learning about expert type and, by way of consequence, about
the asset’s true value.
5.2 Bad Experts and Market Crashes
The possible occurrence of reputational cascades has far-reaching consequences for the func-
tioning of financial markets, suggesting interesting avenues for research, and helping shed light
on events related to the latest financial crisis. This section summarizes our main observations
on the issue.
First and foremost, our paper provides a tractable model explaining financial markets’
difficulty to evaluate experts when feedback about ability is endogenous, and occurs through
the impact of expert advice on prices. If the expert is good, reputational cascades work to his
detriment, since they slow down the market’s learning about his type. If the expert is bad,
cascades work in his favor, allowing him to maintain a reputation for extended lengths of time.
However, in both cases cascades will cause prices to deviate from long run levels: if the expert
is good, it will take longer before the market incorporates his information into prices; if he is
bad, the market won’t discard his advice in the medium run. These remarks are aggravated
by the fact that in a cascade a bad expert no longer exposes himself by publishing reports,
22When reputation converges to zero, nobody is expected to have superior information: adverse selection
disappears. When reputation does not converge to zero, prices must contain all information about the asset
(resp., the expert), since otherwise the report (resp., the ability signal) will confer an informational advantage
upon the trader.
23In sharp contrast to Avery and Zemsky (1998), for example.
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and responds in turn by releasing more (false) information. Thus, in a cascade an expert with
low ability will exert greater influence on prices.
Next, how is market activity affected by reputational cascades? First, as noted above,
when the market enters a cascade, the rate at which a low ability expert releases information
increases. Second, when driving a reputational cascade, an expert’s advice induces probability
1 of trade occurring.24 Reputational cascades thus maximize expected traded volumes over
a given period of time. In this sense, our analysis sheds light on episodes of frenzies taking
place in financial markets, and identifies a new channel through which they can occur.
Finally, we conclude with some key remarks regarding the possibility of using our frame-
work and analysis to shed light on the occurrence of crashes in financial markets. The intuition
is simple. When the market is in a reputational cascade, it stops accumulating information
about the expert but goes on accumulating information about the asset. As the amount of
information contained in the public history grows, a trader with a negative signal of the expert
type stands to make increasing profits by using this signal to trade against historical trends.
Cascades therefore end precisely as prices become high. A crash occurs when the market exits
a reputational cascade driven by a low-ability expert. At this point, the market starts to
evaluate the expert again and prices revert toward zero. Rather than being caused by the
release of new information, crashes in our model therefore result from the simultaneous and
uniform depreciation of past accumulated information.25 These insights are, to the best of our
knowledge, novel.26
5.3 Herding vs. Reputational Cascades
The occurrence of reputational cascades is akin to herd behavior on the part of informed
traders. The first traders to arrive screen the expert according to their private signal of the
expert type. A trader who arrives following a sequence of reputation-enhancing events, on
the other hand, believes that with some probability those who came before him observed
positive signals of the expert type. When the sequence of reputation-enhancing events is
24Formally, in a cascade rt 6= 0⇒ yt 6= n.
25This is in sharp contrast to e.g. the classic model of Lee (1998) wherein transaction costs lead traders
to accumulate information until a trigger occurs, at which point the sudden release of traders’ information
induces prices to re-adjust abruptly.
26Veldkamp (2006) shows a positive empirical correlation between indicators of ‘herding’ (high price and
high price volatility) and the quantity of news in the market. She remarks that this is inconsistent with
traditional herding models: increased information should remediate the information asymmetry problem and
dissolve the herd. However, as argued above, this positive correlation is exactly what our model predicts.
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sufficiently long, the resulting beliefs swamp the information contained in the trader’s signal
of the expert type. At that point, even if he observes a negative signal of the expert type, a
trader will decide to trust the expert and trade according to the advice contained in his report.
‘Informational herding’ (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2000) then prevails. However, unlike classic
herding models, traders do not follow the actions of those who precede them: in a reputational
cascade, they buy following a positive report and sell following a negative one. Instead, they
herd in the sense of blindly following expert advice after observing others doing so.
6 Conclusion
By choosing whether or not to follow expert advice, privately informed traders ordinarily
allow markets to evaluate expert ability. We investigate in this paper the performance and
implications of the resulting feedback mechanism. A trader receiving a ‘buy’ advice but
observing a negative signal of the expert’s ability faces a dilemma: he may choose to ignore
the advice, allowing the market to learn about his assessment of the expert; if the expert turns
out to be good, however, he foregoes by doing so a profitable opportunity. Expert screening
thus breaks down due to traders’ failure to internalize the full benefits from learning about
the expert’s type. Reputational cascades – in which no new information about the expert
reaches the market – occur from strategic experts exploiting the resulting market failure. In
a reputational cascade, bad experts publish more aggressively since they can do so without
the risk of being revealed. Reputational cascades thus maximize (bad) trading activity. Even
though markets are informationally efficient in the limit, this may lead to significant medium
run distortions: frenzies and crashes may occur. Rather than being caused by the release of
new information, crashes occur in our model due to the sudden depreciation of information
already incorporated in prices.
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A Appendix: Proofs
To shorten notation, we will throughout the Appendix let γ := µ
µ+(1−µ)/3 .
Proof of Lemma 1: Parts of the proof uses results and definitions from later Claims and
Lemmas. We here simply sketch the main arguments.
Let Bλet+1(rt) = Et[λt+1|B] (resp. Gλet+1(rt) = Et[λt+1|G]) denote a bad expert’s (resp.
good expert’s) expectated reputation next period from playing rt in the current period, under
equilibrium (σt, ξt, pt). Either screening breaks down in this equilibrium, or it does not. If it
does, then Gλet+1(rt) =
Bλet+1(rt), for all rt, and a good expert is indifferent between truthfully
reporting his private signal or lying. If it does not then for xt 6= 0 we have Gλet+1(xt) >
Gλet+1(rt), rt 6= xt, while for xt = 0: Gλet+1(rt) = Bλet+1(rt), for all rt.

Before proving Lemma 2 we show the following claim, which states that we can (partially)
rank valuations in equilibrium. We take t andHt as given, allowing us to drop time subscripts.
Claim 1. Let θGt (−1) > 0. Then, in any equilibrium of period t:
1. vt(1, 1) is (strictly) the highest of all valuations.
2. vt(−1, 0) is (strictly) the lowest of all valuations.
3. vt(−1, 0) < p0t < vt(1, 1).
In particular, in any equilibrium of period t: ξat (1, 1) = 1 and ξ
b
t (−1, 0) = 1.
Proof of Claim 1: Part 1 is immediate. We prove the second part. Let (σ, ξ, p) denote the
equilibrium considered.
Step 1: v(−1, 0) < v(0, 0). Let β(r, s) denotes a trader’s updated belief of the expert type
after observing (r, s) in the current period. We have:
λe(0, σ, ξ) = λe(−1, σ, ξ) > β(−1, 0).
Step 1 now follows since
v(−1, 0) = β(−1, 0)θG(−1) < λe(0, σ, ξ)θG(−1) = β(0, 0)θG(−1) < β(0, 0)θG = v(0, 0).
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Step 2: v(−1, 0) < v(1, 0). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that v(−1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0).
Then β(−1, 0) > β(1, 0), and so σ−/q− < σ+/q+. But v(−1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0) also implies (using
Step 1) that v(1, 0) is the lowest valuation, in which case ξb(1, 0) = 1. Since, by Part 1 of the
Claim, ξa(1, 1) = 1, it is now easy to see27 that we must have λe(1, σ, ξ) < λe(−1, σ, ξ). But
this is impossible, in equilibrium.

Proof of Lemma 2: By Proposition 3, if screening breaks down in period t then a trader
observing (rt, st) = (0, 0) learns nothing about the asset nor about the expert. Thus vt(0, 0) =
p0t and, by Claim 1, this trader abstains in equilibrium and a fortiori plays no role in the
determination of prices.28
We work the rest of the proof for the case where θGt (−1) > 0 (other cases can be treated
similarly). By Claim 1, in any equilibrium a (informed) trader with (rt, st) = (1, 1) buys the
asset with probability 1 while a trader with (rt, st) = (−1, 0) sells the asset with probability
1. Thus, for screening to break down, a trader with (rt, st) = (1, 0) must buy with probability
1 while a trader with (rt, st) = (−1, 1) must sell with probability 1.
The first condition is consistent with equilibrium price setting if and only if
λt(1− pi)q+t
λt(1− pi)q+t + (1− λt)q+t
· θGt (1) ≥
γq+t
γq+t + 1− γ
· λtθGt (1) +
1− γ
γq+t + 1− γ
· λtθGt ,
which is satisfied for λt ≥ λˆ+t , where
λˆ+t = 1−
1− pi
pi
·
(1− γ)
(
1− θGt
θGt (1)
)
γq+t + (1− γ) θ
G
t
θGt (1)
.
The second condition is consistent with equilibrium price setting if and only if
θGt (−1) ≤
γq−t
γq−t + 1− γ
· λtθGt (−1) +
1− γ
γq−t + 1− γ
· λtθGt ,
27The underlying arguments are similar to those used in the proofs of Claims 3 and 5. We do not repeat
them.
28Notice that by part 3 of Claim 1: pbt < p
0
t < p
a
t .
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which is satisfied for λt ≥ λˆ−t , where
λˆ−t = 1−
(1− γ)
(
1− θGt (−1)
θGt
)
γq−t
θGt (−1)
θGt
+ 1− γ
.
Setting λˆt = max{λˆ+t , λˆ−t }, the previous arguments thus establish that an equilibrium exists
where screening breaks down if and only if λt ≥ λˆt.

We next state and prove a series of claims in view of establishing Lemma 3. In these
claims we take t and Ht given and fixed. In particular, this allows us to drop time subscripts.
Furthermore, we let λe(r, σ, ξ) denote a bad expert’s expected reputation at the beginning of
next period from playing r, when his strategy is σ and informed traders behave according to
ξ. Thus, in equilibrium:
λe(−1, σ, ξ) = λe(0, σ, ξ) = λe(1, σ, ξ). (1)
Claim 2 then proves that if in two equilibria the expert has the same strategy, then prices also
must be the same in the the two equilibria. Claims 3-4 remark that more screening leads to
lower expected reputation, and Claim 5 that a more aggressive behavior from a bad expert
lowers his corresponding expected reputation. Finally, Claim 6 links expert strategy, prices
and screening.
Claim 2. Let (σ1, ξ1, p1) and (σ2, ξ2, p2) be two equilibria such that σ1 = σ2. Then p1 = p2.
Proof of Claim 2: The strategy σ determines the valuations of all traders. For z ∈ [−1, 1],
and assuming that given the prices all informed traders play a best response, the functions
haσ(z) = E[θ|y = a, pa = z, σ]
hbσ(z) = E[θ|y = b, pb = z, σ]
are well-defined.
Note that the function haσ is strictly increasing for z such that h
a
σ(z) > z, and strictly
decreasing for z such that haσ(z) < z. Moreover, h
a
σ(p
0) > p0 while haσ(1) < 1. Hence there
exists a unique z such that haσ(z) = z; this is the competitive ask price.
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Similarly, the function hbσ is strictly decreasing for z such that h
b
σ(z) < z, and strictly
increasing for z such that hbσ(z) > z. Moreover, h
b
σ(p
0) < p0 while hbσ(−1) > −1. Hence, there
exists a unique z such that hbσ(z) = z; this is the competitive bid price.

Claim 3. Consider σ such that σr > 0, ∀r.
1. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side then λe(1, σ, ξ
1
) ≥ λe(1, σ, ξ
2
),
with strict inequality unless ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side too.
2. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the negative side then λe(−1, σ, ξ
1
) ≥ λe(−1, σ, ξ
2
),
with strict inequality unless ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the negative side too.
Proof of Claim 3: Let, for P(y|r, ξ, B) > 0:
L(y|r, ξ) = P(y|r, ξ, G)
P(y|r, ξ, B) .
Note that
E[L(y|r, ξ)|r, ξ, B] =
∑
y:P(y|r,ξ,B)>0
P(y|r, ξ, B)P(y|r, ξ, G)
P(y|r, ξ, B) = 1.
Using Bayes’ rule:
λe(r, σ, ξ) = E[Mσr(L(y|r, ξ))|r, ξ, B], (2)
where Mσr(x) =
λqrx
λqrx+(1−λ)σr is concave.
Observe next that if ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side then L(y|r =
1, ξ
1
) = 1 for all y. So either ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side too or,
conditional on the expert being bad, the distribution of L(y|r = 1, ξ
2
) is a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of L(y|r = 1, ξ
1
). In the latter case we obtain, by (2) and concavity
of Mσ+ : λ
e(1, σ, ξ
2
) < λe(1, σ, ξ
1
).
The proof of Part 2 of the Claim is similar, and omitted.

Claim 4. Let r, r′ ∈ {−1, 1}. If for y 6= yˆ we have ξy(r, 0) = ξyˆ(r, 1) = 1 and moreover
σr
qr
> σ
r′
qr′ , then λ
e(r′, σ, ξ) > λe(r, σ, ξ).
Proof of Claim 4: The proof is similar to that of Claim 3 and is therefore omitted.
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Claim 5. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening then for any ξ
2
:
1. σ+2 > σ
+
1 ⇒ λe(1, σ1, ξ1) > λe(1, σ2, ξ2).
2. σ−2 > σ
−
1 ⇒ λe(−1, σ1, ξ1) > λe(−1, σ2, ξ2).
Proof of Claim 5: Using the same notation as in the proof of Claim 3:
λe(1, σ2, ξ2) = E[Mσ+2
(
L(y|r = 1, ξ
2
)
)|r = 1, ξ
2
, B]
< E[Mσ+1
(
L(y|r = 1, ξ
2
)
)|r = 1, ξ
2
, B]
= λe(1, σ1, ξ2)
≤ λe(1, σ1, ξ1).
The first inequality follows from the fact that Mσ+2 (x) < Mσ
+
1
(x) for all x. The last inequality
is an application of Claim 3.
The proof of Part 2 of the Claim is similar, and omitted.

Let ∆σr = σr2 − σr1. Then
Claim 6. Consider asymmetric timing of information acquisition. Assume θG(−1) > 0. Let
(σ1, ξ1, p1) and (σ2, ξ2, p2) be two equilibria. If ∆σ
− < 0, ∆σ+ ≥ 0 and ∆σ0 > 0, then pb1 ≤ pb2.
Furthermore, if pb1 = p
b
2 then ξ
b
2(0, 0) = ξ
b
2(1, 0) = 1.
Proof of Claim 6: Denote the valuations in equilibrium (σi, ξi, pi) by vi(·), for i = 1, 2.
Either Equilibrium 2 preserves the ordering of traders’ valuations from Equilibrium 1 or it
does not. Call these Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
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Case 1: Using notation from the proof of Claim 2:
pb1 = h
b
σ1
(pb1)
=
γλ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
1(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spisθG(r) + (1− γ)λθG
γ[λ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
1(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spis + (1− λ)(ξb1(−1, 0)σ−1 + ξb1(0, 0)σ01 + ξb1(1, 0)σ+1 )] + (1− γ)
= min
z∈[−1,1]
hbσ1(z)
≤ γλ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spisθG(r) + (1− γ)λθG
γ[λ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spis + (1− λ)(ξb2(−1, 0)σ−1 + ξb2(0, 0)σ01 + ξb2(1, 0)σ+1 )] + (1− γ)
≤ γλ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spisθG(r) + (1− γ)λθG
γ[λ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spis + (1− λ)(ξb2(−1, 0)σ−2 + ξb2(0, 0)σ02 + ξb2(1, 0)σ+2 )] + (1− γ)
= hbσ2(p
b
2)
= pb2.
The first inequality is due to the fact that, since equilibrium 2 preserves the ordering of traders’
valuations from equilibrium 1:
γλ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spisθG(r) + (1− γ)λθG
γ[λ
∑
(r,s) ξ
b
2(r, s)q
r(1− pi)1−spis + (1− λ)(ξb2(−1, 0)σ−1 + ξb2(0, 0)σ01 + ξb2(1, 0)σ+1 )] + (1− γ)
= hbσ1(z),
for some z ∈ [−1, 1].
The last inequality follows from ξb2(−1, 0) = 1 (Claim 1), the observation that
∑
r ∆σ
r = 0,
and the sign assumptions on ∆σr:
ξb2(−1, 0)∆σ− + ξb2(0, 0)∆σ0 + ξb2(1, 0)∆σ+ = ∆σ− + ξb2(0, 0)∆σ0 + ξb2(1, 0)∆σ+
≤ ∆σ− + ξb2(0, 0)∆σ0 + ∆σ+
= (ξb2(0, 0)− 1)∆σ0
≤ 0.
In particular, a necessary condition for pb1 = p
b
2 is that ξ
b
2(0, 0) = ξ
b
2(1, 0) = 1.
Case 2: Similar to Case 1, except that the first inequality in the sequence is now a strict
inequality since in this case informed traders’ behavior ξ
2
is “inefficient” given the valuations
from equilibrium 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3: Fix t and Ht. In particular, this allows us to drop time subscripts. As
usual we work the proof for the case where θGt (−1) > 0. Other cases can be treated similarly.
Let (σ1, ξ1, p1) denote the equilibrium where screening breaks down (E1), and (σ2, ξ2, p2)
some arbitrary equilibrium (E2). We will show that (σ2, ξ2, p2) = (σ1, ξ1, p1).
Step 1: σ2 = σ1. We consider 3 Cases.
Case 1: σ+2 > σ
+
1 . Applying Claim 5 yields λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(1, σ1, ξ1). Hence (1) implies
λe(r, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(r, σ1, ξ1) for all r. Then σ
0
2 > σ
0
1, and thus σ
−
2 < σ
−
1 . Applying Claim 5 again,
we must have ξb2(−1, 1) < 1, since otherwise λe(−1, σ2, ξ2) > λe(−1, σ1, ξ1), a contradiction.29
Applying Claim 6 gives pb2 ≥ pb1. This together with ξb2(−1, 1) < ξb1(−1, 1) = 1 yields
v2(−1, 1) ≥ pb2 ≥ pb1 ≥ v1(−1, 1). Since v2(−1, 1) = v1(−1, 1), we have pb2 = pb1. Then from
Claims 1 and 6: ξb2(1, 0) = ξ
a
2(1, 1) = 1. Furthermore:
σ+2
q+
>
σ+1
q+
= 1 =
σ−1
q− >
σ−2
q− .
30 Applying
Claim 4 then gives λe(1, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(−1, σ2, ξ2), again a contradiction with (1).
Case 2: σ+2 < σ
+
1 . Thus: λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(1, σ1, ξ1). Otherwise, (1) and Claim 5 would yield
σ02 ≤ σ01 and σ−2 ≤ σ−1 , a contradiction. Applying Claim 5 again: ξa2(1, 0) < 1.31 And by (1):
σ02 > σ
0
1.
It follows that v2(1, 0) ≤ pa2, whereas v1(1, 0) ≥ pa1. Since v(1, 0) is decreasing in σ+,
then v2(1, 0) > v1(1, 0), implying p
a
2 > p
a
1. Recall that p
a
i is a convex combination of vi(1, 1),
vi(1, 0), vi(0, 0), vi(−1, 1) and p0.32 Let p˜ai denote the fictitious ask price obtained from
removing traders observing (r, s) = (1, 0). Thus: p˜a2 ≥ pa2 > pa1 ≥ p˜a1. Notice that p˜ai is
decreasing in σ0i and does not depend on σi in any other way. Thus p˜
a
2 < p˜
a
1, a contradiction.
Case 3: σ+2 = σ
+
1 . Rule out σ
−
2 < σ
−
1 as in Case 1. Now suppose σ
−
2 > σ
−
1 . Then σ
0
2 < σ
0
1,
and hence λe(0, σ2, ξ2) > λ
e(0, σ1, ξ1). But that is impossible because, applying Claim 5, we
must have λe(1, σ2, ξ2) ≤ λe(1, σ1, ξ1), a contradiction with (1).
29In particular, if ξb2(−1, 1) = 1 then E2 would have a break-down of screening on the negative side. E2
would then play the role of the equilibrium with break-down of screening in Claim 5.
30That σ+1 /q
+ = 1 = σ−1 /q
− follows from Proposition 3 below, as screening breaks down in E1.
31If ξa2 (1, 0) = 1, screening would break down on the positive side: λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2) > λ
e(1, σ1, ξ1).
32By Claim 1, vi(−1, 0) < pai and hence does not enter the ask price.
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Step 2: p
2
= p
1
. Follows from Step 1 together with Claim 2.
Step 3: ξ
2
= ξ
1
. From Step 1, we have λe(0, σ2, ξ2) = λ
e(0, σ1, ξ1). Applying Claim 3
then immediately establishes that in E2 screening must break down on both sides. That
ξn2 (0, 0) = ξ
n
1 (0, 0) = 1 follows from noting that p
b
i < p
0 = vi(0, 0) < p
a
i , i ∈ {1, 2}.

Proof of Proposition 3: First notice that if screening breaks down in period t and a bad
expert mimics a good one, then λet+1(rt) = λt for all rt. Mimicking is thus a best response if
screening breaks down in period t. In fact, by Claim 5, it is the unique best response. This
establishes the first part of the Proposition.
Next, suppose that screening does not break down in period t and σt ≥ qt. Arguments
similar to those developed in the proof of Claim 3 then establish that either λet+1(1) < λt or
λet+1(−1) < λt (or both). Either way, we obtain a contradiction since σt ≥ qt ⇒ σ0t ≤ q0t ⇒
λet+1(0) ≥ λt.

Proof of Proposition 4: If a complete informational cascade occurs in period t then pbt =
p0t = p
a
t . By Claim 1 the bid-ask spread must be strictly positive unless (possibly) λt = 0.
But this is ruled out, since in that case there would have to be t′ < t such that λt′ > 0 and
λt′+1 = 0. Clearly no outcome (rt′ , yt′) would ever induce this in equilibrium.

Proof of Theorem 1: For Part 1, notice that a break-down of screening is a necessary
condition for a reputational cascade to occur. But, by Proposition 1, screening is always
efficient under symmetric timing of information acquisition.
We next prove Part 2 of the Theorem. By Proposition 3, a break-down of screening in
period t implies σt = qt and thus Pt(rt|τ) = Pt(rt), for all rt. If the trader in period t is a
liquidity trader, his action is unaffected by rt and a fortiori also unaffected by the type τ .
If he is an informed trader then his action is unaffected by st – by definition of screening
break-down – but may be affected by rt. Yet, since σt = qt, an informed trader’s action must
be unaffected by the type τ . This shows that if screening breaks down in equilibrium in period
t, then Pt(rt, yt|τ) = Pt(rt, yt) for all rt, yt. Hence, if we can show that screening breaks down
30
for some time t and history Ht, where the probability of Ht occurring is non-zero, then we
are done.
Using Proposition 2, observe that for any time t and history Ht there exists a threshold
λˆt < 1 such that screening breaks down in equilibrium in period t if λt > λˆt. So we only need
to show that some history Ht such that λt > λˆt in fact occurs with positive probability.
Fix λt. Notice that choosing θ
G
t sufficiently close to 1 guarantees the following sequence of
inequalities:
vt(−1, 0) < vt(1, 0) < p0t < vt(−1, 1) < vt(1, 1).
So choosing θGt sufficiently close to 1 guarantees efficient screening in equilibrium.
33 This in
turn implies that we can find (rt, yt) such that Pt(rt, yt|τ) > 0 for τ = B,G and λt+1(rt, yt) ≥
g1(λt), where
gn(w) =
w(γpi + (1− γ))n
w(γpi + (1− γ))n + (1− w)(1− γ)n .
Notice that gn(w)
n→∞→ 1, for all w ∈ (0, 1). In particular, for any w and w, 0 < w < w < 1,
there exists n(w,w) ∈ N such that
gn(w,w)(w) > w.
We can now show that, starting from λ0 > 0, in equilibrium an expert (whichever his
type) can in finite time achieve any desired level of reputation λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) with strictly positive
probability. First, accumulate positive reports inducing θG sufficiently close to 1 that, for all
λ < λ˜, efficient screening is guaranteed in equilibrium. Note that this can be done whichever
the type of the expert, given Claim 7, and moreover can be done all the while maintaining at
least reputation λ0 > 0. If at that point reputation is above λ˜ then we are done. Otherwise,
increasing reputation during at most n(λ0, λ˜) consecutive periods induces a reputation at least
equal to gn(λ0,λ˜) > λ˜.
Finally, let λˆ0 denote the threshold required for screening to break down given Rt = ∅.
If λ0 ≥ λˆ0 then a reputational cascade occurs at t = 0 and the statement of the Theorem is
trivial. Consider next λ0 > λˆ0. By the previous step we know that λˆ0 can be achieved in finite
time T . Let RT−1 denote the sequence of reports accumulated at that point, and R2T−1 an
arbitrary sequence of reports such that θG2T−1 = 0.
34 Again applying Claim 7 then, starting
from time T , R2T−1 is generated with positive probability, independently of the expert’s type.
33Recall that in this case pbt < p
0
t < p
a
t .
34One such sequence is given by rt = rt−T , for t ∈ {T, T + 1, ..., 2T − 1}.
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Moreover – once again – this can be done while maintaining at least reputation λT , in which
case: λ2T−1 > λˆ0. The proof is now concluded by noting that the threshold prevailing at that
point is λˆ2T−1 = λˆ0 < λ2T−1. A reputational cascade thus ensues.

Before proving Theorem 2, we prove a series of claims. Claim 7 establishes a lower bound
on a bad expert’s propensity to publish reports. Claim 8 deduces that an infinite number of
reports is published almost surely. Claim 9 lower-bounds the probability that a significant
jump in reputation occurs, whenever reputation has not converged to either zero or one. Claim
10 shows that reputation eventually will converge to either zero or one, almost surely. Finally,
Claim 11 concludes that reputation converges to the ‘correct’ value. With these results in
hand, we then prove the theorem.
Claim 7. There exists δ > 0 such that in any equilibrium and for any history Ht and r then
σrt > δ.
Proof of Claim 7: Notice that due to liquidity traders we can find ` > 0 such that for any
rt, yt and ξt then (using notation from Claim 3):
`−1 < Lt(yt|rt, ξt) < `.
Note also that for any history Ht and any report rt then qrtt ∈ [1−φ2 , 12 ]. Thus for any Ht, rt,
yt and ξt:
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, G)
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, B)
=
qrtt Pt(yt|rt, ξt, G)
σrtt Pt(yt|rt, ξt, B)
>
(1− φ)`−1
2σrtt
.
Hence:
σrtt <
1− φ
2
`−1 ⇒ Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, G)
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, B)
> 1.
The claim now follows by setting δ = 1−φ
2
`−1, since if a bad expert were ever to issue report
rt with less than probability δ, then he could, by publishing rt, increase his reputation with
certainty. But we know by Proposition 3 that this is impossible in equilibrium.

Claim 8. In any equilibrium, an infinite number of reports is published a.s..
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Proof of Claim 8: Follows from Claim 7 and applying the first Borel-Cantelli Lemma.

Claim 9. For all λ˜ ∈ (0, 1), there exists ελ˜ > 0 and δλ˜ > 0 with the following property: if
|λt − λ˜| < δλ˜ and (σt, ξt, pt) denotes an equilibrium in period t where screening is efficient,
then
Pt(|λt+1 − λt| > ελ˜) ≥
1
2
.
Proof of Claim 9: Let λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) and define the functions G1
λ˜
and G2
λ˜
by
G1
λ˜
(u, v;x) :=
λ˜u
λ˜u+ (1− λ˜) −
[
1− µ
3
· λ˜v(γpi + (1− γ))
λ˜v(γpi + (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)(1− γ)
+
(1− µ
3
+ µx
)
· λ˜v(γ(1− pi)x+ (1− γ))
λ˜v(γ(1− pi)x+ (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)((1− γ) + γx)
+
(1− µ
3
+ µ(1− x)
)
· λ˜v(γ(1− pi)(1− x) + (1− γ))
λ˜v(γ(1− pi)(1− x) + (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)((1− γ) + γ(1− x))
]
;
G2
λ˜
(u, v;x) :=
λ˜u
λ˜u+ (1− λ˜) −
[
1− µ
3
· λ˜v(γpix+ (1− γ))
λ˜v(γpix+ (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)(1− γ)
+
1− µ
3
· λ˜v(γpi(1− x) + (1− γ))
λ˜v(γpi(1− x) + (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)(1− γ)
+
(1− µ
3
+ µ
)
· λ˜v(γ(1− pi) + (1− γ))
λ˜v(γ(1− pi) + (1− γ)) + (1− λ˜)
]
.
For i = 1, 2, Gi
λ˜
(u, v;x) is continuous, increasing in u, decreasing in v, and using arguments
similar to those of Claim 3: Gi
λ˜
(1, 1;x) > 0, for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Let B((u, v), η) be the η-
ball around the point (u, v). In particular, we can thus find a radius ηλ˜ such that (u, v) ∈
B
(
(1, 1), ηλ˜
)⇒ Gi
λ˜
(u, v;x) > 0, i = 1, 2.
Next, notice that if λt = λ˜ and (σt, ξt, pt) denotes an equilibrium in period t where
screening is efficient then equilibrium conditions imply that we can find x+, x− ∈ [0, 1] with
G1
λ˜
(
q0t
σ0t
,
q+t
σ+t
;x+) = 0 and G2
λ˜
(
q0t
σ0t
,
q−t
σ−t
;x−) = 0, or vice versa.35 Thus, by the previous step:
(
q0t
σ0t
,
q+t
σ+t
) /∈ B((1, 1), ηλ˜) and ( q0tσ0t , q−tσ−t ) /∈ B((1, 1), ηλ˜).
35We place ourselves here in the case θGt (−1) > 0. By Claim 1, traders observing (rt, st) = (1, 1) buy with
probability 1 and traders observing (rt, st) = (−1, 0) sell with probability 1. This implies that when screening
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By proposition 3, either (a) one of
q+t
σ+t
and
q−t
σ−t
is lesser or equal than 1 or (b) both are
strictly greater than 1:
Case (a): Suppose that
q+t
σ+t
≤ 1 (the case q−t
σ−t
≤ 1 is similar). Then, for all x ∈ [0, 1]:
G1
λ˜
(
q0t
σ0t
,
q+t
σ+t
;x) ≥ G1
λ˜
(
q0t
σ0t
, 1;x). In particular:
q0t
σ0t
> 1−ηλ˜ ⇒ G1λ˜(
q0t
σ0t
,
q+t
σ+t
;x+) ≥ G1
λ˜
(
q0t
σ0t
, 1;x+) > 0.
But this contradicts the equilibrium condition. Hence
q0t
σ0t
≤ 1− ηλ˜.
Case (b): We have in this case |σ0t − q0t | = |σ+t − q+t |+ |σ−t − q−t |. Since moreover qrt ∈ [1−φ2 , 12 ],
for all r, we can find η′
λ˜
> 0 such that (
q0t
σ0t
,
q+t
σ+t
) /∈ B((1, 1), ηλ˜)⇒ | q0tσ0t − 1| ≥ η′λ˜.
Now define η′′
λ˜
:= min{ηλ˜, η′λ˜}. We then have, following publication of report rt = 0:
|λt+1 − λt| =
∣∣∣∣ λ˜ q
0
t
σ0t
λ˜
q0t
σ0t
+ (1− λ˜)
− λ˜
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣ λ˜(1− η′′λ˜)λ˜(1− η′′
λ˜
) + (1− λ˜) − λ˜
∣∣∣∣
:= 2ελ˜.
The claim now follows by continuity of Gλ˜(u, v;x) in all of its variables, including λ˜.

The sequences (λt) and (θ
G
t ) are bounded martingales with respect to the filtration (Ht).
The Martingale Convergence Theorem thus applies. We let in what follows the random
variable λ denote the (a.s.) limit of the sequence (λt) and θ
G the (a.s.) limit of (θGt ).
Claim 10. Let λ = lim
t→∞
λt. Then λ ∈ {0, 1} a.s..
Proof of Claim 10: We prove the claim for asymmetric timing of information acquisition
(the proof for the symmetric case is almost identical, and therefore omitted).
Let W denote the event λ /∈ {0, 1}. Note that by Claim 8 then θGt must converge to either
1 or to −1 almost surely. Furthermore, if λ ∈ (0, 1) and θGt tends to 1 we obtain, for t large
enough:
vt(−1, 0) < vt(1, 0) < p0t < vt(−1, 1) < vt(1, 1).
is efficient traders observing (rt, st) = (1, 0) randomize between two actions at most (sell and abstain), as do
traders observing (rt, st) = (−1, 1) (buy and abstain). The scalar x+ parameterizes the strategy of traders
observing (rt, st) = (1, 0). The scalar x
− parameterizes the strategy of traders observing (rt, st) = (−1, 1).
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If λ ∈ (0, 1) and θGt tends to −1 we obtain similarly, for t large enough:
vt(−1, 1) < vt(1, 1) < p0t < vt(−1, 0) < vt(1, 0).
Either way, this implies that screening eventually becomes efficient almost surely.
Now let W (λ˜, δλ˜/2) denote the event |λ − λ˜| < δλ˜/2, where λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) and δλ˜ as defined
in Claim 9. Clearly W (λ˜, δλ˜/2) ⊂ W . By the previous step, for any ω ∈ W (λ˜, δλ˜/2) we can
(almost surely) define a smallest time T (ω) such that for all s ≥ T (ω): (a) screening is efficient
and (b) |λs − λ| < δλ˜/2. Let Vk = {ω : T (ω) = k}. Then W (λ˜, δλ˜/2) =
⋃
Vk. Furthermore,
applying Claim 9:
P
(|λs+1 − λs| > ελ˜|Vk) ≥ 12 , s ≥ k.
But (λt) converges almost surely. Hence, P
(
Vk
)
= 0, for all k, and ultimately P
(
W (λ˜, δλ˜/2)
)
=
0.
Let B(λ˜, δλ˜/2) denote the open ball with center λ˜ and radius δλ˜/2. For any n, the interval
[1/n, 1 − 1/n] has an open cover consisting of open balls B(λ˜, δλ˜/2), λ˜ ∈ [1/n, 1 − 1/n]. By
compactness, we can extract a finite sub-cover
(
B(λ˜s, δλ˜s/2)
)S
s=1
. Then
P(λ ∈ [1/n, 1− 1/n]) ≤ P
(
λ ∈
⋃
B(λ˜s, δλ˜s/2)
)
≤
∑
P
(
λ ∈ B(λ˜s, δλ˜s/2)
)
= 0.
This being true for all n, we finally obtain P(λ ∈ {0, 1}) = 1.

Claim 11. The market learns the expert type almost surely. Let λ = lim
t→∞
λt: if τ = G then
λ = 1 a.s.; if τ = B then λ = 0 a.s.
Proof of Claim 11: Consider first τ = B. In any equilibrium:
Et
[ λt+1
1− λt+1
∣∣∣B] = ∑
rt+1,yt+1
Pt(rt+1, yt+1|B) · λtPt(rt+1, yt+1|G)
(1− λt)Pt(rt+1, yt+1|B)
=
λt
1− λt
∑
rt+1,yt+1
Pt(rt+1, yt+1|G)
=
λt
1− λt .
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Hence E
[
λt
1−λt
∣∣∣B] = λ01−λ0 , for all t. Fatou’s Lemma then gives E[ λ1−λ∣∣∣B] ≤ λ01−λ0 . Hence
P(λ = 1|B) = 0.
Similar derivations give E
[
λt
1−λt
∣∣∣G] = 1−λ0λ0 , for all t, and so E[1−λλ ∣∣∣G] ≤ 1−λ0λ0 . Hence
P(λ = 0|G) = 0.
Claim 11 now follows immediately, by application of Claim 10.

Proof of Theorem 2: If the expert is a good expert then the Law of Large Numbers yields
lim
t→∞
θGt = θ a.s.. Both parts of the Theorem now follow from Claim 11.

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